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Abstract. Communicative practices in online and social media sometimes seem to amplify 
political conflict, and result in significant harms to people who become the targets of col-
lective outrage. Many complaints that have been made about political correctness in the 
past, we argue, amount to little more than a veiled expression of resentment over the in-
creasing influence enjoyed by progressive activists. But some complaints about political 
correctness take on a different complexion, in light of the technologically-driven changes 
to our communicative practices and political discourse. Given the ways in which they are 
entangled in these new forms of online communication, well-meaning attempts to police 
the norms of political correctness may end up contributing to individual wrongs, or to 
destructive social patterns. In this paper we examine these worries, situate them in a 
broader sociological context, and offer some tentative proposals about how they might be 
addressed. 
 
1. Introduction 
The term ‘political correctness’ refers to a suite of social practices that involve 
avoiding or policing behaviour – usually speech – that is seen as derogating people 
in subordinated social groups. The aim of this paper is to critically examine the 
ramifications of some recent cultural trends that seem to be modifying the ways 
in which these social practices are carried out.  
Debates over political correctness are a staple of the culture wars in contempo-
rary liberal democracies. Since its emergence into mainstream discourse in the 
1980s, the term has primarily been a term of abuse. The standard usage of the term 
is to claim that political correctness has ‘gone mad’ – that progressives have gone 
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overboard in trying to discourage bad speech, resulting in the blanket condemna-
tion of people who don’t hew to progressive ideals, in a way that is inimical to 
free speech and ideological diversity. We believe that those kinds of complaints 
are largely wrongheaded. They mischaracterise the routine antagonisms of parti-
san political discourse as an aberrant program of suppression solely carried out 
by ‘the left’. In §2 we elaborate on this contention, citing a few other authors who 
have argued along similar lines. 
What we then want to argue, however, is that there are new reasons to worry 
about political correctness, which differ from these familiar complaints. The po-
licing of political correctness has become interwoven with forms of social inter-
course – operating across social media, online media, and traditional broadcast 
media – that are intensifying the routine antagonisms of political discourse. The 
consequences of this aren’t easy to gauge. But there are prima facie reasons to be-
lieve it is harmful for particular individuals, and that it’s ultimately likely to ad-
vantage the opponents of the ideals that political correctness norms stand for. In 
§3 we expand on these claims, and discuss some of the ways in which political 
correctness norms are involved in the modes of social intercourse we’re adverting 
to. In §4 we survey some themes in sociological scholarship that can be used to 
characterise these new modes of communication, and to contextualise them in 
relation to some of the larger transformations in the nature of social and political 
power ushered in by the forces of globalisation. We conclude with some sugges-
tions about how we might address these new tensions around political correct-
ness. 
 
2. The standard script around political correctness 
As we say above, the main use of the term ‘political correctness’ is to express a 
complaint about how progressives censure behaviour that they see as being in-
volved in oppressive social relations. A predictable script is often followed in con-
flicts where the language of political correctness is invoked. First, someone in the 
public eye makes a comment with perceived racist (or sexist, or homophobic) 
overtones. Second, spokespeople for the cultural left publically condemn the 
speaker’s comment, and in many cases, by extension, the speaker herself. And 
then third, opponents of the cultural left, making common cause with the speaker, 
say that free speech is under siege, or that ideological conformity and thought 
policing are being imposed. The familiar refrain – “this is political correctness 
gone mad!” – encapsulates the third move. 
Notice that the claim is nearly always that political correctness has gone mad – 
not just too far, but positively mad – suggesting a degeneration from some earlier 
state of sanity. Opposition to political correctness is thus rhetorically packaged-
up with some notion of the Good Old Days, before punitive cultural mores pro-
hibited heterodox opinion. These scripts have been set in place for some time now. 
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In a New York Times article in 1990, the lawyer Richard Bernstein observed that the 
– at that time, still relatively unfamiliar – term, “politically correct” 
Has become a sarcastic jibe used by those, conservatives and classical liberals 
alike, to describe what they see as a growing intolerance, a closing of debate, 
a pressure to conform to a radical program or risk being accused of a com-
monly reiterated trio of thought crimes: sexism, racism and homophobia. 
(Bernstein 1990) 
These remarks do a good job at encapsulating the concerns expressed by the first-
wave of the anti-PC brigade in America’s pre-Millennial culture wars, including 
authors like Kimball (1990) and D’Souza (1991). It is striking, though, how well 
they capture the core themes of anti-PC discourse today, in the 2010s. For in-
stance, Kirsten Powers (2015) suggests that supporters of political correctness 
think of all opponents of gay marriage as unregenerate bigots – as opposed to rea-
sonable people with traditional attitudes about marriage – and she complains 
about the left’s hounding of those that it views as ‘heretics’, to silence them and 
make an example of them for the rest of society. Even though Bernstein casually 
observed the same kinds of anxieties at work over a quarter of a century ago, Pow-
ers frames her concerns as a reaction to the distinctive set of social and political 
conditions that has emerged in the 2010s. 
This is indicative of a general difficulty that anti-PC critics have in positioning 
their views in relation to the doomsaying of their predecessors. It is harder to take 
dire prophecies about the slippery slope to left-wing authoritarianism seriously 
given that there has been similar scare-mongering for decades. Conservative po-
litical views are alive and well, after all, and influential in many quarters. There is 
a point of similarity here with the intergenerational amnesia that occurs when 
Baby Boomers, once themselves seen as hippy rebels, turn to diagnosing the gen-
erational shortcomings of Millennials. And this similarity isn’t purely a coinci-
dence. For some authors, anti-PC bromides go hand-in-hand with the pathologi-
sation of Millennial youths. One example of this is Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan 
Haidt’s article “The coddling of the American mind” (2015), which critiques ideas 
and practices that are central to contemporary progressive activism in higher ed-
ucation, like ‘microaggressions’, and the use of ‘trigger warnings’. Lukianoff and 
Haidt claim that the special vulnerabilities of young adults raised in the 1990s are 
resulting in a breakdown of the traditional university ethos of free inquiry, and 
giving birth to a corrosive culture of victimhood. But despite the time-stamping 
of these observations, Lukianoff and Haidt’s ideas have much in common with 
those in the 1987 book that their title alludes to, Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the 
American Mind. Where Bloom lamented the modern university’s “homogenization 
of American culture”, which, on his view, was geared towards the avoidance of all 
confrontation (1987, p. 35), Lukianoff and Haidt now sound similar warnings 
about efforts to ‘scrub campuses clean’ of ideas that make others uncomfortable. 
The telling resemblances aren’t only in the views being advanced, but in the ar-
gumentative styles being employed. Like Bloom, Lukianoff and Haidt offer a mix 
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of horror stories about people being attacked for saying the wrong thing, specu-
lation on the flaws of the young people driving the trends, and forecasts about the 
authoritarian misery that the trends are leading to. 
Just as the shape of anti-PC discourse has been set in place for a long time, there 
is, correspondingly, a stock repertoire of moves used in counterarguments against 
anti-PC discourse. The critical point emphasised by many defenders of political 
correctness is simply that all sides of politics – conservatives and progressives 
alike, and all their sub-groups and branches – engage in aggressive public critique 
of their opponents, while also, where possible, using informal methods of censure 
to undermine the visibility and effectiveness of their opponents’ messages. Ac-
cording to this line of analysis, there were never any Good Old Days during which 
political discourse was unencumbered by punitive cultural mores. The ideal 
which lies at the heart of American First Amendment doctrine – of public debate 
being “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” – has always been a utopian aspira-
tion rather than a social reality.1 All that has changed, in contexts where political 
correctness norms have gained some ascendancy, are the facts about which mores 
are subscribed to by which people, and about which infringements of social mo-
res can therefore be effectively dissuaded using informal censure.  
John Wilson made this point nicely 20 years ago, coining the term ‘Conservative 
Correctness’ to signal the patent fact that conservatives are also known to hound 
people for professing verboten opinions – for example, in the United States, anti-
Israel, or pro-Communist views (Wilson 1995, pp. 31ff). The milder form of this 
line of argument simply draws attention to this evident symmetry, like in Nat 
Hentoff’s (1992) insistence that both sides of politics routinely try to censor each 
other. But there are more provocative variations on this kind of critique. Robert 
Sparrow (2002) argues that proponents of anti-PC discourse aren’t merely being 
obtuse in failing to acknowledge the ubiquity of cultural contestation around po-
litical speech, that they are, rather, engaged in an intentional program of obfusca-
tion aimed at discrediting legitimate progressive critique of conservative policy. 
By this line of reasoning, what opponents of political correctness are really de-
manding isn’t just the right to speak in ways progressives dislike, but to be free 
from criticism or resistance when they do. Stanley Fish (1994) takes another tack, 
suggesting that the entire discourse around political correctness comes with an 
implicit suggestion that it’s possible to address social issues in a way that is above 
or outside politics, and insisting that this isn’t merely false, but a pernicious mas-
querade. At the extremities we find critics like Judith Butler (1998) saying that 
censorship is everywhere, that some things are always unsayable – that this is a 
condition of linguistic communication itself: to impose an order on our thoughts 
that renders some things articulable and others not – and that complaints about 
censorship tend to obscure the ways in which speakers are always already cen-
sored. 
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One needn’t venture to such extremes, though, in order to make the point that’s 
essential for our purposes. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander. As 
Paul Krugman (2012) says, “right-wing political correctness… has lots of power 
and money behind it”, such that “even talking about the wealthy brings angry de-
nunciations” and “even talking about inequality is class warfare”. In light of this, it 
seems inaccurate and tendentious to claim that there is something specially coer-
cive in progressives trying to shout down their political opponents. One may la-
ment the fact that this is how political discourse typically functions, in modern 
liberal societies, and argue that greater effort should be made, on all sides of pol-
itics, to resist the impulse towards aggressive censure and outrage-mongering as 
communicative strategies. Our point is that this isn’t some novel, nefarious trend 
that has been created by leftist cunning, or made possible by the emotional fragil-
ity of babyish Millennials. This is politics as usual. 
 
3. Cyber-mobbing and public shaming 
It is important to keep all of the above in mind when we encounter fresh com-
plaints about the supposed scourge of political correctness. Much of what ani-
mates these complaints is resentment over the fact that friends of progressive ide-
als have built up a greater capacity to censure, pressure, and influence public dis-
course in a way that the establishment – big business, entrenched political inter-
ests, traditional print and broadcast media, and the custodians of traditional 
views on sex and sexuality (including the church) – have been able to do all along. 
However, having emphasised these misgivings about how appeals to political cor-
rectness often function, we now want to argue that some current-day anxieties 
about the spectre of political correctness, bespeak reasonable concerns – by 
which we mean: concerns that aren’t just self-serving, biased, or obtuse – about 
the destructive potential of the methods through which the censuring, pressuring, 
and influencing of public discourse are now being carried out. 
When the first wave of widespread anti-PC sentiment bubbled up in the late 
1980s, social media didn’t yet exist, traditional news media companies were rela-
tively stable and profitable, ‘mobbing’ was a method of coercion confined to 
workplaces, and no-one had ever uttered the word ‘clickbait’. Today, complex so-
cio-political ecosystems have been spawned by the rapid technological transfor-
mation of communication technology and the media, and in particular, by social 
media’s erosion of the old boundaries separating everyday communication tech-
nology from the prestige media. In the wake of this transformation it has become 
relatively easy for mobs of anonymous people to, in a loosely coordinated manner, 
harass, threaten, and publically shame people they never meet, but whose mis-
deeds have been broadcast online and disseminated in turn. What is interesting 
about these episodes isn’t merely their harmful potential, but also their dispro-
portionality and chaotic unpredictability. An ill-expressed comment on Twitter 
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will often sink without a trace, like a momentary faux pas at a social gathering, but 
in some cases it will unexpectedly escalate and result in the tweeter being publi-
cally disgraced.  
The worries arising due to these phenomena are importantly unlike the gripes 
that drive old-fashioned anti-PC bellyaching. Of course there was never any pre-
lapsarian era in which public political discourse was free from people attempting 
to shout down their opponents and take them down a peg. That kind of conflict 
can be seen as a natural (if regrettable) element of democratic discourse. So to be 
clear, the sense in which political correctness is running amok, today, doesn’t lie 
in the mere fact that hostile contention surrounds our communication. It lies in 
the amplification of hostilities, and the unleashing of volatile social forces through 
new modes of social intercourse that are global in reach, tolerant of anonymity, 
near-instantaneous, and often blasé about (or positively opposed to) customary 
liberal attitudes about privacy.  
The phenomena that we’re adverting to here aren’t obscure. Jon Ronson’s book 
So You’ve Been Publically Shamed (2015) was a bestselling investigation of these 
trends, focusing on accounts of people whose lives were thrown into turmoil by 
online backlashes in response to their perceived cyber-sins. One of the more no-
torious examples of this, discussed by Ronson, is the case of Justine Sacco. In 2013, 
Sacco, a communications director, tweeted the message “Going to Africa. Hope I 
don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white” before boarding a flight from New York 
to Cape Town. When her flight landed half a day later, Sacco’s clumsy attempt at 
edgy humour, addressed to her coterie of Twitter followers (but visible to the 
wider world), was the top-trending topic on Twitter internationally. And this 
level of attention, combined with the common interpretation of her tweet – that 
she was being derogatory towards black people, rather than making an ironic 
comment on white privilege – resulted in her being sacked, denounced on news 
websites around the world, and receiving thousands of abusive messages (Ron-
son 2012). Similar cases are discussed in Jennifer Jacquet’s book Is Shame Necessary? 
(2015), and while Jacquet wants to identify some positive potential in public 
shaming tactics as a way to advocate for reforms in corporate practices, she rec-
ognises, like Ronson, that shaming is a tool that can be wielded against individu-
als to devastating effect. 
Anecdotes like the Sacco case could be multiplied at length, but by themselves 
they don’t reveal much about the prevalence of the phenomena in question, nor 
do they offer an overarching perspective on how what we’re seeing today is dif-
ferent in kind from the methods of informal social coercion that were available 
pre-internet. In making the case that something new and pernicious is afoot, 
when it comes to online shaming and cyber-mobs, we can go beyond individual 
anecdotes to make general observations about the institutional changes in news 
media and communications technology over the last decade. First, social media 
networks that allow people to easily broadcast their thoughts to the whole world 
7 
 
are now ubiquitous, whereas as recently as 15 years ago they were a niche product. 
Second, traditional news media – particularly broadcast media – has acquired a 
habit of mining social media for stories, so that conflicts playing out in a social 
media context have a chance of receiving mass attention beyond the immediate 
circle of participants. It is hard to identify a historical precedent for this process 
in which random chatter – including spats between strangers, and off-hand re-
marks to no one in particular – can be rapidly vacuumed-up into the production 
of mass media. Third, traditional print and broadcast media are locked in compe-
tition with online media for audience share. And fourth, styles of communication 
that originated in online contexts – like clickbait journalism – are increasingly 
involved in journalistic and editorial practices at large, as media companies mi-
grate away from print circulation to mobile content-delivery platforms. 
The point of these observations is to note that while there have always been ran-
corous political quarrels, bullying demagogues, and volatility around mob-like 
behaviour, the communication landscape of today allows for wider (often anony-
mous) participation in this, while speeding everything up, and equipping us with 
gadgets that keep us in constant contact, so that a consciousness of the punitive 
cultural mores of different groups casts a shadow over every moment of online 
communication. We say that technological developments allow these things to 
occur, but that’s probably understating things. Political conflicts and outrages 
have been tactically commercialised by media organisations, with notional affili-
ations to both progressive and conservative audiences. There are many people em-
ployed right now, in jobs that didn’t even exist at the turn of the millennium, 
whose professional success hinges on how effectively they can manufacture out-
rages and controversies to be shared via Twitter and Facebook. 
One might view the changes that we’re describing as a democratising develop-
ment, and therefore welcome news for the progressive ideals associated with po-
litical correctness. That seems too sanguine, though, for at least two reasons. First, 
as the Sacco case suggests, even well-meaning attempts by progressives to police 
ideals of anti-racism, anti-sexism (etc.) can contribute to significant harms be-
cause of the volatile social dynamics created by new technology and media. Sec-
ond, these dynamics can be exploited by speakers and groups who are hostile to 
socially marginalised people. The powers that have been unleased can be used to 
attack radical progressives, neo-Nazis, and everyone in between. The Gamergate 
controversy, in which several prominent women in the video game industry faced 
vicious online harassment over their criticism of the industry’s prejudices against 
women, is just one of many recent cases in which the punitive enforcement of 
cultural ideals – at the intersection of online communication, social media, and 
traditional media – was used to attack advocates of a progressive agenda (see 
Massinari 2015). Given the content of the attacks, of course no one was inclined 
to describe this episode as an instance of ‘political correctness gone mad’. But the 
style of the social pressure involved in Gamergate was structurally similar to that 
involved in the online enforcement of political correctness norms today. It was 
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ostensibly a case that involved people being harassed and vilified by others, who 
were largely unknown to them, over their violation of – or opposition to – social 
mores that those participating in the harassment wanted to uphold. 
In sum, then, even if we grant that there is some sort of democratisation occurring 
in these evolving modes of social discourse, its impact on the relation between 
dominant and subordinated social groups is at best ambiguous. The power of the 
angry, loosely-coordinated, anonymous swarm can be used to exert pressure on 
people who express and enact prejudicial views. But equally, this kind of power 
can be – and sometimes is – used to threaten women, ethnic minorities, and other 
dissident voices who engage in social critique in public forums, only to find them-
selves targeted in the cross-hairs of the reactionary blogosphere. And insofar as 
these episodes lead to a wider degeneration of political discourse, the implica-
tions of that seem unlikely to aid progressive political causes. When people on all 
sides of politics are at risk of becoming the targets of mass outrage, it seems like 
the politics of hatred, xenophobia, and tradition has a competitive advantage over 
a politics of hope, inclusion, and social transformation. 
 
4. The fragmentation of social and discursive power 
We have suggested that developments in media and communications systems 
have made it possible for people with relatively minimal resources and institu-
tionalised social power to nevertheless have a serious impact on the policing of 
public discourse, and to impose significant costs and penalties upon individuals 
who transgress de facto social norms. 
In this section we situate these observations in a wider sociological context. De-
velopments in communications technology are aligned with transformations in 
politics and economics, which have complicated and sometimes inverted struc-
tures of social power. These changes are a focal point in the work of contemporary 
sociologists seeking a new theoretical conception of power, which makes sense 
of the influence exerted by the apparently disempowered. Zygmunt Bauman’s ac-
count of ‘post-Panoptical’ power is a foray in this direction. “What mattered in 
the Panopticon” according to Bauman, “was that the people in charge were as-
sumed always to ‘be there’, nearby, in the controlling tower” (Bauman 2000, p.11). 
By contrast, he says 
What matters in post-Panoptical power-relations is that the people operating 
the levers of power on which the fate of the less volatile partners in the rela-
tionship depends can at any moment escape beyond reach – into sheer inac-
cessibility. (Ibid, p. 11)  
What Bauman has in mind in this characterisation is exemplified in the position 
of super-rich individuals who aren’t affected by the material limitations that con-
strained the wealth and resources of their predecessors. Whereas “Rockefeller 
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might have wished to make his factories, railroads and oilrigs big and bulky and 
own them for a long, long time to come”, Bauman says, someone like Bill Gates 
“feels no regret when parting with possessions in which he took pride yesterday” 
(Ibid, pp. 13-14). Rockefeller’s power and prestige were grounded in material 
strongholds – and were vulnerable to material forms of contestation: theft, sit-ins, 
and vandalism – in a way that Gates’ power isn’t. Instead, Gates’ power is “exter-
ritorial, no longer bound, not even slowed down, by the resistance of space”. The 
type of power that Gates enjoys, according to Bauman, “augurs the end of the era 
of mutual engagement” (Ibid, p. 11). 
This disengagement is epitomised in global capital’s frictionless flow towards tax 
havens, and its slipping out of the control of the state, leaving the state to compete 
for the affection of businesses by deregulating labour and creating tax havens. But 
the key point here isn’t about the power of capital – which still, after all, aligns 
with traditional social hierarchies – it is about the nature of the power that capi-
tal is wielding. It is a power that, in John Urry’s terms “is all about speed, lightness, 
distance, the weightless, [and] the global” (2002, p. 60). The crucial change is in 
the decoupling of social power from the modes of coercive force that the state 
monopolises. Violent coercion is still a kind of direct engagement. The newly dis-
engaged power is available to a wider range of actors; “elites as well as those re-
sisting elites” (Ibid, p. 60). 
We can view the social changes discussed in §3 in that light. It is becoming easier 
for people to be harmed by attackers with whom they never directly interact. The 
power at work in these cases is neither the monopolistic power of the state, nor 
the oligarchic power of the media baron, but the power of the swarm: geograph-
ically unbounded, fluid, spontaneous, and leaderless – and for all these reasons, 
difficult to contain. These features indicate some common ground between social 
media activists and exponents of sub-state military tactics; guerrillas, insurgents, 
and terrorists. In different ways, both kinds of actors partake of “the power of the 
powerless to inflict… harm upon institutions of imperial power, especially those 
buildings, institutions and people that symbolize the intense condensation of im-
perial power” (Urry 2003, p. 130). This comparison risks exaggerating the stakes 
of social media, but the correspondences are there all the same. While episodes of 
leader-less cyber-harassment are likely to be most damaging when they’re target-
ing everyday people, as in the Sacco case, they can also harm the interests of pub-
lic figures, whose off-hand remarks can be quickly seized upon by social media 
users and characterised to the wider world in a scandalised, sensationalistic 
mood. These episodes occur alongside a growing stream of news stories in which 
traditional media reports on, and amplifies, commentary originating on social me-
dia. Social media thus exerts a kind of power over traditional media, “exerting a 
gravity-effect, with almost the whole world ‘watching’ and being seduced into 
being ‘watched’” (Urry 2002, p. 61). At the same time, though, traditional media 
institutions themselves become watched in a new way. Casually misogynistic 
banter on television, and other blasé public expressions of privilege, now become 
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Captured, represented, transported, marketed and generalized elsewhere. 
They get carried along the scapes and flows of the emerging global world, mo-
bilizing ideas, people, images, moneys and technologies to potentially every-
where. (Urry 2003, p. 80) 
The 2016 scandal in Australia around the sexist banter of media personality Eddie 
McGuire demonstrates these features. The scandal only broke a week after the 
offending remarks were broadcast on commercial radio, after being dissected in a 
then-obscure online podcast.2 In short, McGuire’s words only registered widely 
after they had slipped across the boundary of a radio broadcast and flowed into 
the digital world, where they were disseminated through social media, so that a 
diverse set of audiences could digest, deconstruct, and denounce them. Scandals 
like these become mediated in unpredictable ways, and cannot be controlled by 
the people involved in them, regardless of the traditional forms of social influence 
they might enjoy. 
These phenomena require a new sociological frame of understanding. Here Bau-
man is helpful again, with his notion of liquid modernity. He defines this by drawing 
a contrast with the age of ‘solid modernity’, as articulated in the canons of classi-
cal sociology. On the classical understanding, the nation-state is a geographically 
contained entity, overseeing a determinate, hierarchical social order, where social 
interactions occur on terms of “mutual dependency, mutual engagement, produc-
tion and servicing of mutually binding and durable bonds” (Bauman 2001, p. 139, 
emphases in original). In a world like this, the society of each nation-state can be 
represented as a discrete organism, in which each component is hierarchically po-
sitioned according to its function.3 Under conditions of liquid modernity these 
structures dissolve. Public discourse becomes unconstrained by national bound-
aries, as exemplified in national newspapers being usurped by global online me-
dia companies. Social and political movements move online and become global-
ised in a similar way. These changes occur incrementally, while at times being 
accelerated by political crises relating to the environment, the economy, and se-
curity. The organic structure of society is superseded by a causal order that ex-
hibits fluid dynamics. Its constituent elements flow around one another – some-
times reacting, sometimes mixing together – without necessarily settling into a 
stable solution (Urry 2003, pp. 104-05). Political leaders, state agencies, compa-
nies, and other classically-conceived actors become entities through which things 
flow: information, ideas, money, images, and influence. 
The government or the media corporation can still be a significant node in the 
causal systems through which the currents of power flow, but they are dimin-
ished in their ability to channel those currents of power. We find ourselves mov-
ing towards a system with “no global society or single centre of global power” 
(Ibid, p. 93). This is true even of the world’s most conventionally powerful polit-
ical actor. The US government still retains “exceptional centrality within most of 
the networks that criss-cross the globe” (Ibid, p. 45). But this centrality is unlike 
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the hegemonic control of earlier superpowers, because it fails to result in any kind 
of inexorable, imperially-driven movement towards a global culture or a single, 
coherent global society under American patronage, or any other sort of central-
ised patronage (Bauman 2001, p. 138). 
It is within this kind of disrupted order that political correctness norms and pro-
gressive language-policing operate today. Progressive activists prosecuting their 
agenda on social media don’t exist straightforwardly above or below traditional 
institutions of power. The power dynamics around political correctness aren’t 
captured by this spatial logic, because they emerge out of a system in which dif-
ferent social levels exert influence on each other without settling into any neat 
organisation. System effects still occur, but not in a structurally predictable way.4 
Media companies, much like the nation-state, can still retain certain trappings of 
old-fashioned privilege. They have wealth, infrastructure, and patronage net-
works, and by virtue of these they retain a capacity to frame agendas and amplify 
messages. But any hegemonic control they might have once enjoyed is compli-
cated by what we might call the microhegemonies that arise in social media enclaves. 
In these enclaves, the conventionally disempowered can sometimes call the shots. 
The power of the media corporation interacts with the fluid power of the conven-
tionally disempowered, just as the nation-state influences the global order while 
being affected by global powers beyond its control. These forms of power are in-
tertwined, in that 
There are parallel, irreversible and mutually interdependent processes by 
which globalization-deepens-localization-deepens-globalization and so on… 
with huge flows of ‘resources’ moving backwards and forwards between the 
two… The global-local develops in a symbiotic, unstable and irreversible set of 
relationships, in which each gets transformed through billions of worldwide 
iterations dynamically evolving over time. (Urry 2003, p. 84) 
The blurring of local and global forces described above is sometimes called “glo-
calisation”.5 Roland Robertson introduces this term in the social sciences to push 
back against the simple assumption that globalisation “overrides locality”, leaving 
in its wake only “local assertions against globalizing trends” (Robertson 1995, pp. 
26, 29, emphasis in original). As an example of why this assumption is an over-
simplification of what globalisation does, consider a minority community within 
a state, some of whose members’ experiences overlap with other minority groups, 
and who accordingly develop relations of political solidarity with them on the 
basis of these “commonality conditions” (Glasford and Calcagno 2012). For Rob-
ertson, this gives rise to a “glocal” form of identity, borne of the experience of 
straddling and moving between the local and global aspects of social experience. 
It is these kinds of ‘glocalised’ identities that sound strongly in the discursive po-
licing of conventional privilege. Where online microhegemonies manage to police 
the discourse of the conventionally powerful, this is partly because they are sim-
ultaneously ‘macro’. They may be governed by less powerful communities within 
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a nation, but they’re also anchored in accessible global movements (e.g. those cen-
tred around gender, race, and sexuality) whose influence is sometimes stronger – 
and more flexible in its borderless reach – than the structures of social influence 
at work within the nation. 
The new sociology of complexity and liquidity that we’re describing underscores 
the already-evident limitations in state-centric free speech theory. If these new 
forms of power mean that the state is becoming less hegemonic – and indeed, is 
vulnerable to ‘liquid’ forms of power – then free speech theory must renew its 
attention to extra-legal forms of censorship and silencing. Whereas, under solid 
modernity, legal punishment was the most threatening source of tyrannical 
power, under liquid modernity the tyranny of the swarm looms large as well. 
The milieu that we’re describing may thus call to mind Mill’s famous remarks 
about the tyranny of the majority. Classical free speech discourse is a product of 
the age of ‘solid modernity’, which partly explains why it tends to be preoccupied 
with censorship by the state, and less concerned with the ways in which informal 
social censure can be used to silence or persecute. This preoccupation has always 
been suspect, in its downplaying of the repressive power of non-state actors.6 (In-
deed, anti-PC discourse tacitly recognises this, given that its usual focal point is 
discourse-policing carried out by private individuals.) In any case, despite being 
a key influence in the formation of this theoretical tradition, Mill’s own writing 
shows a subtle appreciation of the ways in which informal social censure can be 
used to silence and persecute. He begins in On Liberty by acknowledging that dem-
ocratic self-rule is a welcome form of progress from rule by autocratic elites. His 
worry, however, is that this development threatens to suppress individuality and 
originality. In a democracy the people rule over themselves, but this means they 
gain the ability to form majoritarian mobs to subjugate supporters of eccentric 
and unorthodox views, to the detriment of everyone’s long-term interests. When 
a democratically self-governed society imposes majoritarian attitudes in this 
manner, according to Mill  
It practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political op-
pression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves 
fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, 
and enslaving the soul itself. (Mill 2001, p. 9) 
What is needed in response to this, Mill says, is a way of protecting people in 
their convictions that goes beyond a mere aversion to the authoritarian domina-
tion of the many by the few. We need durable safeguards against society’s ten-
dency to “prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its 
ways” and to compel “all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its 
own” (Ibid, p. 9). Mill’s recommended framework to this end – liberal individu-
alism, underwritten by the harm principle – has largely been absorbed into the 
background conditions of today’s conflicts, and so by itself it probably cannot be 
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expected to fix things. But his account of social tyranny is informative nonethe-
less. It helps to sensitise us to the crushing sense of exposure that afflicts the per-
son who speaks in public forums, while knowing that she’s at risk of being 
mobbed by people eager to threaten and vilify her. The advice frequently given to 
authors publishing online work on political issues – “never read the comments 
section!” – is indicative of how that pressure gets a purchase on people today. And 
although we should be careful not to assert any simplistic equivalences in giving 
an account of how these pressures are experienced on different sides of politics, 
it’s at least worth noting that this sense of being hounded into silence shows up 
in the reports both of people condemned for their infringement of political cor-
rectness norms, and also people harassed over their public promotion of the kind 
of progressive ideals that underpin political correctness norms. 
Mill says that exposure to this kind of pressure ‘enslaves the soul itself’. It is a 
grandiose way of stating the point, but there is probably a grain of truth in it all 
the same. A version of this idea resurfaces in work by Nagel (1998), who suggests 
that the unravelling of privacy norms in political life not only drives capable peo-
ple away from the public sphere, but also erodes our commitment to the principle 
that people should be allowed to process their anxieties away from other people’s 
surveilling gaze. Some version of this idea is also suggested in relational accounts 
of autonomy developed by contemporary feminist philosophers (e.g. Mackenzie 
and Stoljar 2000). If one’s identity as an autonomous being is formed and sus-
tained in one’s social relations, then the threat of mass public censure doesn’t just 
constrain the expression of one’s self, it also has the potential to jeopardise one’s 
status as an autonomous individual. 
However one fleshes out the claim, exactly, the thing that Mill was worried about 
is clear enough. An important part of a person’s mental life and self-image be-
comes impaired when living under conditions that penalise her for failing to con-
form to the prevailing social codes and cultural orthodoxies. Many authors have 
identified the ways in which these pressures arise for members of particular social 
groups; Mill’s observations about the mental costs imposed by the tyranny of the 
majority aren’t news to the oppressed. What has changed for all of us, though, in 
light of the social-technological transformations that we have been describing 
here and in the previous section, is that the tyranny of the majority has splintered 
out into a plurality of potential tyrannies. There are no simple majorities in a glo-
calised world, and the power that comes with ‘following the crowd’ no longer 
follows a predictable trajectory. In the unruly ecosystem of online and social me-
dia, there are new ways to use informal censure to attack privileged individuals 
and defenders of traditional centres of power. But informal censure can equally 
be used to attack members of oppressed groups and progressive activists. 
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5. Implications 
Our suggestion, then, is that the routine antagonisms of political discourse are 
becoming more volatile, as online communication transforms our social customs, 
and that this effect is symptomatic of broader technological and sociological 
changes that are reorganising established power structures. We have argued that 
the policing of political correctness norms has become intertwined with new and 
destructive modes of online social intercourse, and we have suggested that these 
modes of intercourse are something to be resisted, rather than embraced. But 
what would resistance involve, exactly? And where does this leave political cor-
rectness? 
We cannot magically disentangle the ideals that underlie political correctness 
from the negative aspects of the communicative systems in which those ideals are 
nowadays expressed. But obviously this doesn’t mean that we should abandon 
the ideals, either. What follows, if anything, is that we may have reasons to adjust 
the norms that express those ideals, or modify the way in which we try to police 
those norms. But nothing in our analysis suggests that we should take a negative 
view of political correctness norms as such, or the intentions that gave rise to 
them in the social milieu that preceded the era of online media. Richard Rorty is 
an example of someone who has a similar perspective on political correctness. He 
says that the academy “encouraging students to be what mocking neoconserva-
tives call ‘politically correct’ has made our country a far better place” (Rorty 1998, 
p. 82). But at the same time he sees some major downsides to this progress. Polit-
ical correctness norms reflect the post-1960s progressive intellectual’s preoccu-
pation with the unmasking of identity-based discrimination and prejudice. But 
these preoccupations displaced the pre-1960s American progressive’s prioritisa-
tion of reformist social policy aimed first and foremost at combatting poverty. 
And according to Rorty, this shift contributed to the dissolution of the coalition 
that defined mid-century American progressive politics, between the labour 
movement and liberal intellectuals (Ibid, pp. 83ff.). 
Rorty’s hope was that there might be a way to relax the preoccupation with po-
litical correctness, and rebuild a broad progressive coalition focused on combat-
ing material injustice, but without losing sight of the urgency of opposing iden-
tity-based prejudice. In a similar vein, the appropriate response to our concerns 
isn’t to downplay the importance of opposing identity-based prejudice, but to 
find ways to enact this opposition that aren’t so integrally involved in – and po-
tentially distorted by – the sometimes toxic mood of social media. Needless to say 
there are many organisations and individuals who aren’t merely focused on scor-
ing points in online culture wars, but who are working in direct, practical ways 
to achieve social change and address material injustices, and who are also unam-
biguously opposed to identity-based prejudice. Those actors can serve as a source 
of inspiration and guidance about how to take the values that animate political 
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correctness offline, in a world that seems to treat online participation as compul-
sory. The very choice to try to enact one’s politics offline – instead of engaging in 
purely discursive or symbolic forms of politicking – seems like a good place to 
start. 
Of course, it is easy to say that we shouldn’t join in with counterproductive modes 
of online communication. It is presumably possible, in principle, for the policing 
of political correctness norms on social media to be done judiciously, without de-
volving into the destructive dynamics that we see in cases of online mobbing and 
cyber-harassment. But it’s part of the nature of these phenomena that the people 
involved in them don’t see themselves as part of a mob. As Kathryn Norlock says, 
“the magnitude of online shaming exceeds what its authors intend or even believe 
to be true” (2017, p. 189). People engaged in these practices will tend to think of 
themselves as merely expressing their feelings, figuring out their political views, 
talking with friends, criticising unjust practices, or simply passing time. It may 
be possible, however, for these insular perspectives to be effectively challenged. 
Norlock suggests that we might be able to nurture a recognition of the ways in 
which online communication can slip out of our reach, and become more destruc-
tive than we intended. If we are going to participate in social media, she says, “we 
should do so with concerted attention to the uncontrollable aspects of the tool 
we employ, and the effects that, though we may not intend them, we are complicit 
in inducing in others or… bringing about” (Ibid, p. 195). For those who feel com-
pelled to carry on prosecuting political correctness norms on social media, paying 
attention to these concerns seems like a minimal condition for doing so in a meas-
ured and socially responsible manner. 
These remarks suggest that we are looking for individually-applicable solutions 
to a problem whose causes are structural. If communication has been technolog-
ically transformed in a way that aggravates the hostility of political discourse, this 
probably isn’t something that can repaired just by individuals trying harder to be 
virtuous. On the other hand, taking a more structural perspective on how to ad-
dress these concerns hardly makes things easier. Short of trying to shut down so-
cial media networks en masse, or some other drastic, benighted, authoritarian in-
tervention, agencies of the state have a limited ability to govern the forces that 
shape communicative practices in this arena. In theory the state could adopt a 
long-term civic education strategy, trying to equip its citizens with the tools they 
need to navigate the hazards of online communication in a more productive way. 
But this seems optimistic to say the least. 
In the absence of dramatic structural reforms, the best we can hope for may be 
the cultivation of a patchwork of sites in which debate is allowed to be genuine 
and robust, while also being cordoned-off from the surveillance and outrage-mon-
gering that so easily escalates into cyber-mobbing. Mediators of discursive spaces 
– in the academy, the media, and the arts – might try to sponsor novel communi-
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cative forums, which seek to free their participants from the self-censoring anxi-
ety that their speech could trigger an online backlash, in something like the way 
that brainstorming exercises are meant to free people from the self-censoring 
worry that their ideas may be regarded as stupid. But these innovations face a 
limiting constraint from the outset. They would only succeed in their aspirations 
to the extent that they break the lines of communication between speakers and 
the audiences they would have once hoped to reach. 
If we sound a little pessimistic about how to respond to these challenges, that is 
no accident. It is easy for liberals, or anyone subscribing to Enlightenment ideals, 
to cling onto a faith in the edifying potential of communication. We can easily 
find ourselves believing that under the right conditions, provided that it is facili-
tated in the right way, open conversation and good faith political discourse will 
help us to understand each other and figure out reasonable compromises wher-
ever they are necessary. This kind of perspective shows up in a more theoretically 
nuanced guise in the work of many political philosophers – Jürgen Habermas 
(1991), Joshua Cohen (1997), and Seana Shiffrin (2014), to name just a few con-
temporary examples. And of course it is reflected in the familiar idea from free 
speech discourse, that the best remedy to harmful speech is more speech. But this 
faith may start to be shaken when one reflects on the dysfunctionality of online 
communication today – the triumph of misinformation, the amplification of par-
tisan hostility, and the spread of online mobs and cyber-harassment. 
One might be lured, then, towards a kind of radical alternative perspective. One 
may start to think that the acrimony that’s unleashed, as political discourse is 
transformed by online communication, isn’t an aberration that derails our under-
lying ability to respectfully disagree with our ideological opponents. Rather, so 
one might say, it is a revelation of something that the editorial supervision of tra-
ditional media frequently masked, namely, our patent inability to deal with the 
conflicts and disagreements that divide our societies. Instead of trying to wriggle 
out of these communicative dynamics that have the potential to hurt themselves 
and their allies as much as their opponents, proponents of political correctness 
norms may come to view political discourse as a battleground, plain and simple, 
and try to make better use of the weapons which define the battle, in order to win 
it. The aggravation of hostilities is just what we need, they might say. Appealing 
to ideals of decorum and ‘fair-play’ in the communicative sphere ultimately makes 
life easier for unregenerate bigots. Anxious hand-wringing about the victims of 
cyber-mobs is just a kind of bleeding-heart squeamishness. Intolerance must be 
met with intolerance. These sorts of remarks represent a significant strand of pro-
gressive thought, and from time to time they receive a careful and sophisticated 
defence (e.g. Marcuse 1965). 
Embracing this way of thinking would be a gamble. If the attempt to trigger mass 
outrage in the censuring of one’s political opponents is deliberately taken up by 
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all sides, as a tactical weapon, then traditionally dominant social classes may ul-
timately prove to be better at wielding that weapon – and gaining strategic ad-
vantages in the changing social order – than their opponents. Subordinated 
groups may want to embrace the volatility that engulfs online political discourse, 
hoping that amid the chaos, their efforts to silence their opponents will be more 
effective than their opponents’ efforts to silence them. But in a context where na-
tionalistic rhetoric and theatrical fearmongering can be effectively used to rally 
mass support for reactionary agendas, that may indeed be a case of political cor-
rectness run amok. When it comes to online communication, opposing rhetorical 
extremes seem to exist in a state of symbiosis. As our remarks above suggest, there 
may be no obvious and straightforward ways to break out of this symbiosis. But 
attempting to break out of it may still be the lesser of two evils. 
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Notes 
 
1 The phrase is borrowed from Justice Brennan’s opinion for the majority in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
(376 U.S. 254, 1964), in which he speaks of America’s “profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”. 
2 Namely, Episode #14 of the Outer Sanctum Podcast, “an unconventional all-female footy [i.e. Australian 
Football League, or AFL] podcast that features six passionate fans… who focus on stories and voices 
rarely heard around the great game of AFL” (see outersanctum.com.au/about/). 
3 As in, for example, Durkheim (1982). This ‘organism’ analogy appears throughout this text and is an 
extension of his positivist ambition of achieving “the scientific study of social phenomena” (Ibid, p. 31). 
4 In Roger Lewin’s words, the interaction of the individual components gives rise to “some kind of 
global property… something you couldn’t have predicted from what you know of the component parts”, 
and this then “feeds back to influence the behaviour of the individuals… that produced it” (Lewin 1993, 
pp. 12-13). 
5 The term is employed throughout Urry (2003); and it also serves as a structuring concept in work by 
Swyngedouw (1997), Bauman (1998), and Roudometof (2005). For discussions of glocalisation in rela-
tion to the media specifically, see for instance Creeber (2004). 
6 In defence of this point, see for instance Fiss (1996), Brison (1998), or more recently, Nash (2018). 
                                                          
